Violent Extremism – Is Prevent Fit for Purpose?

The tragic murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe, and Alice Da Silva Aguiar have left the UK grappling with profound questions about how society identifies and prevents acts of extreme violence.

The attack in Southport has reignited debates around mental health, radicalisation, and, once again, the effectiveness of the Prevent programme. Whilst Home Secretary Yvette Cooper rightly acknowledged the grief and trauma faced by the victims’ families and the wider community in her statement to the House of Commons, she also raised urgent concerns about the failures of multiple agencies in identifying the risk posed by the perpetrator, Axel Rudakubana.

Rudakubana’s history of engagement with police, social services, mental health professionals and Prevent raises important questions, particularly about whether the current frameworks in assessing terror risk can effectively enable intervention to prevent tragedies from occurring.

Since the introduction of the Prevent programme, the Home Office’s definitions of terrorism and extremism have been continually expanded to take into account and reflect the changing face of terrorist threat e.g. amendments to include acts against members of the armed forces. The difficulty with this reactive approach is that through this expansion, the clarity of the core definitions of terrorism and extremism becomes unclear, making it problematic for professionals to interpret and make appropriate assessments.

Indeed, the Southport attack highlights the evolving nature of violent extremism and whether conventional definitions of terrorism are still fit for purpose. Rudakubana was referred to Prevent three times as a young teenager, yet none of those referrals led to intervention. The Crown Prosecution Service described him as “a young man with a sickening and sustained interest in death and violence” who had “shown no sign of remorse.” Whilst this language suggests a deep-rooted ideological or psychological fixation with violence, it did not initially fit the traditional mould of terrorism driven by political or religious extremism as defined in the Prevent framework.

This statistic challenges the assumption that terrorism is always linked to a structured ideology. It raises the issue of whether the UK’s counter-terrorism frameworks need to adapt to recognise and respond to individuals who exhibit violent tendencies without explicit political or ideological motivations.

The broadening scope of extremism risks blurring the line between criminal pathology and terrorism and, if Prevent is expected to deal with violent individuals whose actions stem from psychological disorders or non-ideological compulsions, this shift directs the programme away from its original counter-extremism purpose.

The Southport case also forces an uncomfortable conversation about the intersection of mental health and violent extremism. Rudakubana’s history raises critical concerns about missed opportunities for psychiatric intervention. The Prevent Learning Review into his three referrals will seek to understand why they were closed. If agencies dismissed concerns about his dangerous behaviour because it was seen as a mental health issue rather than extremism, this suggests a systemic failure to assess risk comprehensively and begs the question- should Prevent operate in closer collaboration with mental health services to create early intervention strategies?

The increasing number of teenagers referred to Prevent and counter-terrorism policing in recent years suggests that the UK is seeing a rise in young people displaying violent extremism-related risk factors. However, if their behaviour does not fit within a recognised terrorist ideology, where does that leave safeguarding agencies?

One of the most pressing issues in this case is the failure of multi-agency safeguarding mechanisms. Rudakubana was in contact with social services, the Youth Justice System, mental health professionals and Prevent, yet none of these agencies recognised or acted upon his escalating danger to others.

The Working Together to Safeguard Children framework is designed to ensure that at-risk young people do not fall through the cracks, yet it has clearly failed in this case. So, when referrals do not meet the Prevent criterion, what mechanisms are in place to safeguard and mitigate risk? Does the system simply close them without ensuring alternative safeguarding support is being immediately actioned? If a Prevent referral is made but does not result in intervention, there needs to be a robust process to ensure that the individual is still monitored and supported through other safeguarding mechanisms. Otherwise, we risk seeing more cases where warning signs were recognised but ultimately ignored.

However, to do this effectively, pathways for urgent referral routes to appropriately trained agencies need to be in place, which poses another major difficulty. Currently, those referral routes are not clear, enabling gaps in case management, and there simply isn’t the structure or capacity within psychiatric or psychological support services to meet needs.

Home Secretary Yvette Cooper has called for a public Inquiry to examine the full scope of failures in this case, alongside urgent reforms to Prevent. This review must examine:

• The rationale for the closure of Rudakubana’s Prevent referrals;
• If new criteria are needed to assess risk in non-ideological cases and if this should be within the Prevent remit;
• The role of mental health services in recognising and acting on signs of extreme violence;
• The efficacy of current multi-agency safeguarding practice.

The Southport attack is a chilling reminder that violent extremism is evolving beyond traditional ideological categories. The UK must adapt its approach to prevent future tragedies, ensuring that young people displaying violent tendencies are identified and managed before their behaviour escalates into unthinkable acts of harm.

Justice has now been served for Bebe, Elsie, and Alice, but for their families and the wider public, the urgent question remains: how do we stop this from happening again?

Sam Preston (Safeguarding Director) & Sara Spinks (SSS Author and Former Headteacher)

5 February 2025